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1. Introduction 
Electronic health records (EHR) are being implemented in countries around the world, as 
the hope is that they will allow health personnel to have more timely access to information 
about patients and their medical history, and to improve quality of care. These objectives 
have translated into major expenditures and effort in order to try to implement national 
EHRs. The United States, for example, passed the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 [1]. In England, from 2003 to 2010, the government spent $20.6 
billion on the National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT) [2]. In Canada, it 
has been reported that $1.6 billion has been alloted to this effort [3]. 
Along with expenditures and efforts to implement these systems, there has recently been an 
interest in the evaluation of national projects to implement an EHR, both in terms of the 
results that have been achieved and the road that has been taken [2-4]. Although evaluations 
of the implementation of national EHRs are still relatively scarce, there have been some 
remarkable efforts. For example, in the case of England, Greenhalgh et al. [2] note that the 
national EHR project was expensive and well behind its implementation schedule, and 
indicate that its success was limited. Furthermore, these authors point out that 
"policymakers appeared to overlook many of their recommendations and persisted with 
some of the NPfIT’s most criticized components and implementation methods" [2](p. 533). 
To explain the limited uptake of their recommendations, they note that policymakers 
generally failed to learn from the evaluations that had been commissioned. 
For their part, Stroetmann et al. [4] identify good practices and lessons learned in European 
countries, while noting that progress has not been simple: "... implementing them (eHealth 
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strategies) has proven to be much more complex and time-consuming than initially 
anticipated. In addition, the complexity of eHealth as a management challenge has also been 
vastly underestimated" [4](p.1349). 
In Canada, a similar broad assessment effort has also occurred recently [3]. A short 
explanation of certain aspects of the Canadian health system, as they relate to the EHR, 
could be useful at this point. Canada is a federation of provinces and territories, which are 
primarily responsible for providing health services to the citizens living in their geographic 
territory. The individual health organizations (private clinics, public hospitals) have a main 
role in maintaining the patient's record, although each provincial Ministry of Health has 
oversight over the public hospitals and, to a lesser extent, some influence on private 
physician's practices. The provincial and federal Ministries of Health set policy and decide if 
they want to support EHR projects. However, at the turn of the century (2001), the federal 
government wanted to insure that patient record systems would be compatible so that a 
citizen who moved from one province to another could still provide a record of treatment to 
his or her new physician. This resulted in an organization (Infoway) and a large federal fund 
to facilitate the development of interoperable systems. This initiative will be further 
described in a particular section below. 
If we return now to the recent analysis of this federal initiative (Infoway), Rozenblum et al. 
[3] observe that "Canada continues to lag behind other Western countries in adopting 
electronic health records" [3]. These authors report that, across the provinces and for 2009, 
only 36% of physicians were using an EHR, and that this was much lower than for countries 
such as Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. The authors 
carried out a set of telephone interviews of key informants from three provinces across 
Canada (not including Quebec), and these informants indicated a number of reasons for the 
poor rate of implementation: lack of an e-health policy (federally and in concert with the 
provinces), inadequate involvement of clinicians, failure to establish a business case for 
using electronic health records, a focus on national rather than regional interoperability, and 
inflexibility in approach.  
In this chapter we wish to take a different approach, by examining decisions that have been 
made during the process of implementing a provincial EHR and the influence that codified 
knowledge may have had on those decisions. Our general goal is to document, and if 
possible, gain deeper understanding of the reasons for which scientific evidence in 
particular may be considered or not in EHR projects. We will argue that in Quebec, but 
probably not unique to it, key decisions regarding EHR implementation have not always 
been based on available knowledge, and this could help to explain the limited success of 
EHR projects here and perhaps elsewhere.  
Currently, under the label of evidence-based medicine, there is substantial interest in, and 
effort by, health researchers to examine empirical evidence in order to identify actions and 
conditions that are most likely to result in positive outcomes for patients. This chapter 
builds on this strategy. Where possible, we will point out certain research results, expertise, 
and evaluation conclusions (which we will call the codified knowledge) that were available 
to decision-makers at the time of their decisions. We will identify specific occasions during 
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which the available knowledge influenced decision-makers (or was available and did not 
have an influence), and we will explore the reasons for which this may or may not have 
occurred. 
2. Methodology 
Our presentation and analysis centre on decisions, projects, and events, along with aspects 
of the political, technological, and social context in Quebec, Canada. As we have indicated 
earlier, because of provincial jurisdiction in the area of health in Canada, significant 
decisions were made in this area by the provincial government, and for this reason, the 
province is a useful unit of analysis. The Federal government also funded some projects, and 
these too represented significant decisions. These are the main decisions that will be 
considered here, although we also recognize that many other decisions took place and likely 
affected the projects, such as the choice of partners, the creation and composition of steering 
committees, the project objectives, the technology used, as well as implementation, training, 
and recruitment strategies.  
The analysis is based on a multiple case study approach [5] which examined the evolution of 
representative EHR projects in the Province of Quebec from the first large scale pilot project 
at the beginning of the 1990’s until just before the development of the current Quebec EHR 
project in the late 2000s (le Dossier santé du Québec, or DSQ). Although this approach limits 
the amount of detail that we can provide for any one project or event, we believe that this 
longer historical view is also useful. Because of the scope of the current project (the DSQ) 
and ongoing analysis of it (for example, annual reports by the Auditor General of Quebec), 
we will not include it here, except for an early initiative that was part of it. Further analysis 
may eventually find that many of our conclusions also apply to it. 
For the analysis here and because of space limitations, a subset of projects or actions were 
chosen for this chapter which are either representative of similar projects or which, 
retrospectively, can be considered to have been a significant event (see Table 1). The choice 
of projects and activities that are discussed here was reached by consensus among the 
authors. The projects selected also allow us to present and discuss several factors which 
influenced the uptake of codified knowledge by the EHR projects in Quebec. 
By codified knowledge, we mean knowledge that has been written down in the form of 
reports or articles. The particular type that we are mostly concerned with here is scientific 
evidence that has been produced by evaluation studies of projects, or research into the 
actual benefits of an EHR, or factors that affect the implementation of EHR projects. Other 
pertinent codified knowledge may have been produced in fields other than scientific 
research. In the case of the EHR, an important area of knowledge consists of an 
understanding of legislation that controls the storage or transmission of a patient's clinical 
information. Rather than to stretch the notion of scientific evidence in order to accommodate 
this type of knowledge, we prefer the more general expression of codified knowledge. 
For each case study, we analyzed public descriptions, evaluations, and reports concerning 
the set of projects and events. This information was supplemented by semi-structured 
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interviews with decision-makers, which allowed us to explore the context in which 
decisions were made, how available knowledge was actually used (or not) to make 
decisions, and factors which influenced its use. A total of 31 interviews were completed with 
key decision-makers who were selected because of their involvement in EHR projects either 
as policy-makers, evaluators, or project leaders. For the first case study, one of the authors 
(JPF) co-directed the evaluation of it. In relation to the final case study, two of the authors 
(MPG and JD) observed several meetings between December 2007 and March 2009 and 
conducted informal interviews with members of a consulting team. 
For each project or activity discussed, we will briefly note its objectives, the major decisions 
that were made, whether certain forces may have influenced the decisions, the types of 
difficulties the project or activity may have experienced, and the knowledge that was gained 
from it. The following table identifies the projects and activities that will be presented. 
 
Project/Activity Approximate Time Period 
The Rimouski Smart Health Card Project  1993-1995 
The Role of the Commision d'accès à l'information (CAI) 1993 - 
Canada Health Infostructure Partnerships Program 2001-2003 
Changes in the Provincial Laws 2001, 2005 
Canada Health Infoway (inclusion of Quebec) 2004 - 
The RSVP: a change management strategy 2007-2009 
Table 1. Major Projects and Activities in Quebec, on the Road to an EHR 
3. Presentation of the case studies 
3.1. The Rimouski smart health card project 
One of the earliest electronic health record projects in Quebec took place in a small city in 
Quebec, Rimouski, from 1993 to 1995. This was one of the first large-scale experiments of 
this type in the world, although it built on a similar concept that was active in France at the 
time (for a later description of a similar concept, see [6]). The Quebec government decided to 
encourage the project, provided financial assistance to it (4 million dollars Canadian), and 
also sponsored an evaluation [7]. The RAMQ (the provincial organization which manages 
health insurance, pays private physicians for their interventions, and issues health cards) 
was the main project manager and associated several stakeholders such as professional 
associations. Proponents of the project hoped that it would help to meet the objectives of the 
dominant ideology of the time, which was a shift to ambulatory care (see, for example [8]), 
and the creation of a better continuum of services by the set of professionals that a patient 
could see. A report from an important consultation on the reform of health care in Quebec 
(known as the Commission Rochon [9]) had also recommended that a trial be carried out with 
the card. Two implicit sub-objectives of the experiment were to decrease drug interactions, 
and to decrease the duplication of lab tests. 
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A group of academic experts was set up in order to plan the implementation of the pilot 
smart health card project. They consulted the literature (which was scarce at the time), along 
with a research group that had implemented the technology in France [10]. The group in 
Quebec included a variety of researchers from various fields (health services, political 
science, evaluation, information technology), as well as medical experts. Significant 
consideration was given to clinical processes and inter-professional collaboration. A local 
physician was also involved in the project team as a strategy in order to increase the 
acceptance by the medical community. The project team used knowledge gained from 
European projects in particular, to inform the implementation of this pilot project. The 
project was envisioned to be a way to produce new knowledge about the benefits of the 
smart card for the health care system, but also to help develop strategies that would be 
useful for a future large scale implementation. 
A specific health card was used for this project, and had a smart chip on it that could record 
information. The concept was essentially to create a portable personal medical record. For 
example, patients’ allergies or reactions to medication could be noted on the card. Citizens 
who wanted to participate had to apply and consent to the project (this consent could be 
withdrawn later), and an office was created to facilitate this. Health professionals needed a 
personal identification number (PIN) in order to access information on the card, as well as a 
card reader and IBM microcomputer. It is useful to remember that, at the time, pharmacists 
often had experience using a computer, but this was not the case for physicians or nurses. 
When a patient went to visit a health professional, they could present the card and so the 
information on the card could be shown to him or her, and if suitably equipped and 
inclined, the professional could in turn add to it. As well, a computer application was 
offered to pharmacists so that they could check for potential drug interactions. At the end of 
the project, there were 7248 users (a portion of the city's population), along with 299 
physicians, pharmacists, and nurses (almost all of the health professionals who had been 
identified as potential users) [7].  
Overall, 73% of the population who had a card used it. Among these patients, about half 
used it with a pharmacist and a physician [7]. One of the decision aids that was most used 
(often by pharmacists) was an application that checked for potential drug interactions. The 
rate of use increased until July 1994, and then decreased, and this coincided with a decision 
to not buy more smart cards for the project. As well, there were indications that the use of 
two different computer systems was an irritant, that use of the card increased the time 
needed for a consultation, and there were occasional problems updating information on the 
card. In the summer of 1995, a sample of patients and health professionals were polled, and 
they generally indicated that the card facilitated the communication of health information, 
in a secure manner. In spite of the problem related to the need to update information, more 
than half of the health professionals felt that it provided quicker access to information, 
allowed them to provide better recommendations, and were satisfied with its quality. As 
well, many indicated that certain characteristics of the project, in particular the slowness of 
the system, did not facilitate its systematic use. 
Some of the professionals felt that the smart health card provided benefits that out-weighed 
the irritants and disadvantages, whereas for others, the advantages were not sufficient. Most 
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found it relatively easy to use, although the system was found to be too slow. In general, the 
physicians and pharmacists indicated that the system contributed to a decrease in drug 
interactions [7].  
The evaluation report included a number of recommendations. For example, such a system 
needed to be compatible with a computer system in a physician's office or a pharmacy, so as 
to minimize work for the professional. As noted previously, the information provided by a 
system should also be up-to-date, and consideration should be given to ways to encourage 
patients to adopt the behavior that project planners hoped they would have, such as 
presenting the card (this affected whether the information was indeed up-to-date). Local 
support for the users was also indicated to be a critical factor, as well as the implication of a 
local leader. As well, the confidentiality of the health information had to be insured. 
In a later analysis of the project, Aubert and Bernard [11] add that the training requirements 
of the health professionals was a significant aspect of the project. As well, they note that 
physicians' offices were generally not equipped with computers. In addition, according to 
these authors, reflection about changes in clinical practices that could maximize the use of 
such technology seemed to be absent (although it was clear that the project hoped to 
decrease drug interactions, and reduce the number of lab exams).  
Although the evaluation included the identification of actions which could contribute to the 
generalization of the project elsewhere, there was no such immediate follow-up. A later 
project in the health region of Laval (north of Montreal), from 1999 to 2001, used another 
smart card, although patient health information was stored in a database managed by the 
RAMQ. The Quebec government considered the smart card to be a viable approach, and 
continued to consider its potential use as late as 2002. In particular, the RAMQ announced in 
2001 that within three years it would provide the card to 80% of the population [11]. 
3.2. The role of the Commision d'Accès à l'Information (CAI) 
In Quebec, the CAI (Commission of Access to Information; our translation) was created in 
1982, and had a significant influence on events and practices in relation to the EHR. In this 
section we will describe this organization and some of its activities in relation to electronic 
health records, and briefly comment on its influence in relation to the development of the 
EHR in Quebec. From the outset, we should note that this organization was not associated 
with a single electronic patient record project, but rather several of them. As well, the 
information it produced was not scientific evidence in the sense that we are generally using 
it here, but could be considered to have produced pertinent codified knowledge. As we 
hope to show, the organization produced information of a particular kind, but nevertheless, 
information that project proponents and the provincial government had to consider. 
In 1982, a law was passed in Quebec, which had an objective of instituting better 
management and protection of information concerning individuals, which was held by the 
government. An organization was created at the same time to administer this law (the CAI) 
and it was "responsible for overseeing compliance with the obligations imposed upon public 
bodies concerning the collection, storage, use and communication of personal information" 
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(http://www.cai.gouv.qc.ca/index-en.html). Health and social service institutions, which 
created databases that contained health information, fell under the mandate of this 
organization. Furthermore, the CAI was authorized to comment on draft bills in this area 
and to assess pilot projects.  
Because of this mandate, the CAI decided to analyze various EHR pilot projects that took 
place in Quebec from 1990 to approximately 2005, as well as on proposed provincial 
legislation. To be clear, it was a decision-maker in this way, since it opted to comment on the 
EHR projects and hoped to steer them in a way that would allow them to be compliant with 
various laws, but it did not have a direct role in the selection of projects which were carried 
out. As an example of one activity, it wrote a report on the Smart Card and its trial in 
Rimouski [11]. Although the CAI considered the approaches taken in this project to be 
useful, problems with the implementation of the card were also noted, such as allowing 
nurses and pharmacists to share a card, and the fact that it consisted of a partial patient 
record.  
A later, more general study carried out by the CAI in 2001 summarizes their examination of 
several pilot projects and outlines their general concern: "The transfer of clinical information 
and the right to privacy are not contradictory. However, their conciliation is complex and 
fragile, especially when they are implemented" [12](our translation, p. 2). A particular 
concern was also presented in this report, in that the authors indicate that the provincial 
health insurance organization, the RAMQ, should not be the organization that handles a 
centralized health record, and it discussed the reasons that motivated it to take this position. 
This 2001 report also summarized the state of legislation in this area: "In relation to the laws 
that relate to the protection of personal health information, these are numerous, haphazard, 
sometimes contradictory, and often insufficient in relation to these new health technologies" 
[12](p. 35). An analysis of the state of the current legislation (in 2001) was also carried out. 
At the end of this analysis, several questions were raised about the legislative foundation for 
certain practices concerning the communication of information, such as who would be 
responsible for the information that is collected, and the regulations that would control this. 
The obvious call for further legislation which was contained in this report eventually lead to 
some proposed laws, and to subsequent analysis by the CAI of these proposed laws. 
In general, one could conclude that the work of the CAI had an influence on the legislation 
that framed the creation of the current provincial EHR project. For example, in 2004, a law 
was proposed that would have modified the main law in Quebec that governs health and 
social services, and the CAI provided an analysis of this [13]. One of the recommendations 
in it was that staff in a health organization should not be able to provide patient information 
to staff in other health organizations without the consent of the patient. As well, the authors 
recommended that the provincial health insurance organization (RAMQ) should not create a 
database that would document the medications used by citizens. 
The fact that the CAI examined several projects and proposed laws over an extended period 
of time indicates that senior managers in the CAI decided that this was an area that needed 
to be examined and monitored. It was also clear that this organization was sufficiently 
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independent from the elected government in order to critically examine the activities of the 
government. Since many managers of pilot projects informed the CAI of their projects and 
actively solicited its opinion about a project, this suggests that these project managers were 
concerned that their projects could potentially contravene existing legislation. At the time, 
managers felt that the rules were ambiguous about what a project needed to do in order to 
conform to existing legislation, and many meeting hours were spent discussing what to do 
about this problem.  
3.3. Canada Health Infostructure Partnerships Program 
At the turn of the millennium (2000-2002), the Canada Health Infostructure Partnerships 
Program (CHIPP) was a two-year, $80 million, 50-50 shared-cost program with an objective 
of supporting collaboration, innovation, and renewal in health care delivery through the use 
of information and communication technologies. One of the specific areas that was funded 
was the creation of EHRs. Project applicants were required to complete a literature review, 
and to include an evaluation.  
In Quebec, three EHR projects were funded through the CHIPP program. One of these, 
called MOXXI, or the Medical Office of the XXI century, was a research project to examine 
the potential benefits of an electronic prescription and drug management system for 
primary care physicians [14]. Two of the project objectives were to streamline the 
prescription process and to improve patient safety. Another aspect examined was the time 
requirements and other ergonomic issues related to the use of the system. One of the 
interesting questions implicit in this project was whether such a computerized system 
would be a help or a hindrance for the physician. This sort of question had generally not 
been asked before, and is still very rare in Canada. As one of the outcomes of the project, the 
authors concluded [15]: "However, there are considerable barriers to developing the 
interfaces necessary with community-based pharmacies to permit exchange of information 
between physicians and pharmacists" [15].  
A second CHIPP project called RIGIC was essentially a project to create a networked EHR 
system which would be shared between two hospitals, for oncology patients. One of the 
outcomes of the project was that shared protocols (between the hospitals) had to be 
established in terms of access and confidentiality procedures. New policies and procedures 
also had to be developed in relation to this, including the development of a consent 
management system. As well, the participants became more aware of the importance of 
change management, and the need for recurrent funding in order to transition the research 
project into an ongoing operation. 
A third project, the SI-RIL project, consisted of the development of an integrated network 
system in a health region (the health region of Laval, north of Montreal), for ambulatory 
patients. This system was designed to enable the sharing of physician orders and patient 
health information among health workers in the region, with a view to regional co-
ordination of care. The participants were: the local hospital, four community health centres 
(CLSCs), and more than one hundred general physicians. 
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During the course of the project, a number of factors were observed which influenced its 
development [16]. For example, the Minister of Health changed repeatedly during this 
period, and it was stated that these changes increased the level of uncertainty. As well, 
health professionals were not necessarily available to participate in the project, so consulting 
them was not an easy matter. 
One of the outcomes was a set of standardized clinical forms which were agreed to by 
health professionals, such as a form to assess patient autonomy. Another was that project 
proponents realized that it was difficult to comply completely with certain outdated laws, 
and they communicated this problem to provincial authorities. Still another outcome was 
that participants noted that significant resources were required in order to manage the 
change process. Observations were gathered about impacts on the work processes, and a 
recommendation was made to the effect that these had to be considered. Quite a few 
documents were produced by the project, which can be taken to be an indicator of a high 
amount of consultation, discussion, and analysis which took place during the project. 
It would appear that the SI-RIL project was one of the most advanced primary care EHR 
projects in Canada at the time. All other networked EHR projects in Quebec involved a 
small group of hospitals (there were a couple of networked hospital projects at the time). An 
evaluation of part of the SI-RIL project was also carried out by a research group [17]. For 
example, the authors highlighted the fact that these were very complex projects, and that 
any one of three types of problems (technological, organizational, clinical) could lead to the 
end of the project [17]. In addition, also noted in the report, was the desire of project 
participants to find a way to avoid illegal transmission or storage of patient information.  
In the case of the RIGIC and SI-RIL projects, the regional health authority was closely 
integrated in the project planning and execution. We mention this since the regional health 
authority has regular communication with the provincial Ministry of Health. This highlights 
the fact that the provincial government was fully informed of the difficulties met by the 
proponents of the three projects, along with the outcomes, at least by 2002, when the project 
funding ended. 
Another significant dimension of these projects was that all of them were based on 
networked health information systems. Patient information was being made available to 
professionals in different organizations, without patient intervention. This fact contrasts 
with a concomitant provincial plan to develop an electronic patient card. 
3.4. Changes in the provincial laws 
In December 2001, the provincial government proposed a law that would have created a 
provincial smart card and replaced the existing health card. It should be pointed out that the 
Laval region had also been involved in a second electronic health card project, which began 
in 1999, and this project was again sponsored by the RAMQ [12]. For those who proposed 
the law, this project provided an example of the type of technology that would be used. One 
of the technological differences with the Rimouski project was that a patient's clinical 
information was centralized in a databank managed by the RAMQ. 
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The purpose of the proposed law was to allow the development of a provincial electronic 
patient record, enabled by the patient's use of a smart card, although the patient record 
would have only been a summary. A law was also necessary in order to allow easier 
communication of health information between health organizations, which were subject to 
restrictions because of laws that were active at the time. With the proposed law, the RAMQ 
would have become the government's manager of the smart card, and the card would have 
included both administrative information (the name, address, and date of birth of the 
patient), and health information. In contrast with the Rimouski project, this information was 
to be centralized in a database. As part of the legislation development process, the 
government included a public consultation on the law. 
More than 50 groups and individuals responded with written comments about the proposed 
law [18]. There was a public debate about the law in the media, which gave rise to what one 
commentator considered to be a sterile debate often based on misconceptions [18]. 
Professional organizations, such as the provincial Nurses Association, Association of 
Pharmacists, and an association of physicians, also joined this debate. One of the specific 
criticisms of the physicians was that a centralized database should not be created, and that a 
government organization should not manage health summaries (a comment directed at the 
RAMQ) [19]. The CAI also questioned the inclusion of administrative and clinical 
information together in one database, and the management of this database by the RAMQ. 
They also reminded the government of the ongoing need (implicitly beyond this law), to 
widen the legislation that would frame the management and access to health information. It 
highlighted the recent creation of family medicine groups, and suggested that such groups 
could be the focus of efforts to computerize health information, since most health services 
were provided by primary care services. Finally, it issued a clear warning about the project: 
... the law that the government has tabled entails solutions that could jeopardize the 
confidentiality of health information. The text has a number of grey zones which do not 
allow us to know with precision the orientations that will be followed. [20] (p. 28, our 
translation) 
In one of our interviews, a government official had this to say about the public debate at the 
time:  
We could say that the proposed law was a major error, the law that was tabled became 
the object of several controversies; several philosophers, the citizens thought that we 
wanted to create a 'big brother', that it was a way for the RAMQ to gain power over the 
health system; the physicians did not want to be controlled and were concerned about 
the way it was developing. (government official) 
The result of the controversy and the questions that were raised was that the government 
withdrew the proposed legislation. In theory, it could have revised the proposed law, but 
perhaps because of the extent and range of the opposition, it decided to abandon it 
completely.  
Two and a half years later, and under a new government, another law was proposed in 
December 2004 (proposed law number 83). Although the CAI and other organizations again 
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tabled reports about the proposed law, there was relatively little public opposition to it, and 
it was adopted almost a year later. It was clear, however, that it had taken many years for 
the government to respond to the request from the CAI to enact such a law. With this law, 
clinical information would now be managed by regional health organizations (there are 18 
health regions in Quebec), and this regional organization, even though it was part of the 
government, was separate from the RAMQ.  
3.5. Canada Health Infoway 
In 2001, Canada Health Infoway (Infoway), was created in order to accelerate the adoption 
of compatible electronic health records across the country. This organization was funded by 
the federal government, but accountable also to the provincial and territories' health 
ministers, all of whom were represented on a Board of Directors. Projects in the provinces 
were generally funded equally by Infoway and provincial governments. Over ten years, $1.6 
billion Canadian was allocated to this project [3].  
One of the main priorities of Infoway was to incite provinces to adopt technologies which 
would allow patient records in one province to be available to health providers in other 
provinces. Another rationale was that it would be possible to save money and time by 
having common technologies deployed across provinces. 
In a report provided in 2005, consultants to Infoway proposed a three-phase approach to 
health technologies. The first phase would consolidate patient data for viewing by health 
professionals, the second phase would allow the documentation of care and provide basic 
decision support, and the third phase would allow physician orders and decision support. 
The estimated cost at that time of reaching the 3rd phase was $10 billion. 
In was not until 2004 that the Quebec government decided to join Infoway. Informants 
indicated that Quebec did not participate in Infoway from 2001 to 2004, and at the end of 
this period, the situation was such that it was the only province which had not yet joined the 
project. One senior official indicated that the discussions during this period were "very, very 
political." The decision to join Infoway was made in 2004, and was taken by a newly elected 
Liberal provincial government (the previous ruling party was the Parti Québécois, a 
sovereignist party). This decision implied that Quebec would need to harmonize its EHR 
plans with those of Infoway and have its projects and deliverables approved by Infoway in 
order to receive the funding contribution by the federal government. In particular, local 
companies which had been supplying technology to Quebec health institutions, would have 
to be compliant with the standards defined by Infoway (for an analysis of the development 
of standards in Canada, see [21]). 
One of the influences that seemed to affect the Quebec government's decision to join 
Infoway, seemed to be the possibility of obtaining financial advantages. As previously 
noted, the federal government provided a significant grant to Quebec (and other provinces) 
as a financial incentive. A form of group purchase of certain technologies also became 
possible. As a government official commented: "In the end, Quebec chose the same solution 
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(PACS technology) which saved us about 16 million, because they (the technology 
company) gave us a discount".  
3.6. The RSVP: An evidence-based change management strategy 
In the subsequent years, work continued with the planning and development of a province-
wide EHR, and culminated in the launch of another pilot project in Quebec City, in May 
2008. In this pilot project, a patient record system was used that was to be expanded across 
the province, the DSQ or Dossier santé du Québec. The DSQ had been developed within the 
Infoway framework, thus the federal government funded about half of it.  
From 2007 to 2009, the DSQ project proponents carried out an implementation strategy, 
which was called the Network for Peer Support, or RSVP (Réseau de soutien et de validation 
par les pairs). The RSVP strategy aimed to facilitate the appropriation of the DSQ throughout 
the province through the mobilization of an interdisciplinary group of healthcare 
professionals (general practitioners (GPs), specialists, nurses and pharmacists). These 
groups were represented by clinical champions for each of the 18 health regions of the 
province. Although the pilot project was only taking place in Quebec City, the belief behind 
the RSVP activity was that the project would soon be extended to the rest of the province, 
and so it was necessary to include professionals from all the regions. The selection of these 
champions was made by the various regional health agencies according to a set of criteria, 
including their credibility, recognition within their peer group, and their interest in 
informatics. The stated roles of the RSVP members [22] were to:  
1. Participate in the elaboration and the realization of the change management strategy at 
the provincial level, by validating and adapting the promotion tools developed by the 
DSQ team to the needs and expectations of the professional groups that they 
represented; 
2. Promote the appropriation of the DSQ within their provincial professional association; 
3. Identify the challenges and obstacles to DSQ implementation in their region and help to 
identify solutions; 
4. Exchange information with other RSVP participants regarding the DSQ in their region, 
provide tips for facilitating appropriation by their peers. 
5. Ensure constant communication with their peers regarding the DSQ and answer their 
questions; 
6. Work in collaboration with other RSVP members, the regional DSQ group, and other 
local groups in order to find solutions to challenges and difficulties identified by the 
DSQ change management team or their peers; 
7. Make recommendations and participate in decisions which concern all aspects of the 
appropriation of the DSQ in their region.  
In the DSQ change management documentation [23], it was clear that this strategy was 
directly informed by evidence in the literature related to the importance of change 
management and consideration of the critical role that clinical leaders play in the 
implementation of large scale EHR projects. As well, the managers of the RSVP had 
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requested and received presentations by Quebec experts on change management. The DSQ 
team had contracted a consulting group, and this group proposed the RSVP strategy. For 
example, RSVP members were offered training and support in order to prepare a promotion 
plan for the DSQ in their region. RSVP members were also invited to answer a 
questionnaire, which measured various aspects pertinent to change management.  
Over the course of the RSVP strategy, the need for an interdisciplinary team was expressed 
but once this team was created, new challenges arose. The rationale for an interdisciplinary 
team was never directly expressed in the written internal documents, but interviews with 
the change management team indicated that this decision was based mainly on the 
perception that resistance from nurses and pharmacists could become an important obstacle, 
if the promotion of the DSQ was left solely to physicians. 
However, important limits to the interdisciplinary team started to appear after a first large 
group meeting. The physicians who had already had extensive discussions about the 
project, had a more extensive understanding of the project, compared to the nurses and 
pharmacists who were new to the group. The large number of participants at the 
interdisciplinary meetings (more than 50 RSVP members plus the DSQ management group 
and invited speakers) made it much more formal than the earlier meetings which had only 
included physicians. RSVP members from the three professional groups agreed that it was 
extremely difficult to have constructive exchanges within such a large group. They also 
believed that issues specific to each profession (remuneration for physicians, access to 
diagnostic data for pharmacists, or responsibility for data entry for nurses) could not be 
easily addressed in an interdisciplinary group. A solution that was put in place was to 
alternate meetings specific for nurses, pharmacists, and physicians, and the interdisciplinary 
meeting. This strategy was costly given the fact that the DSQ team had to reimburse 
participants’ travel and time. A teleconference was then used, given these constraints, but 
many RSVP members found that the exchange did not progress as well as with the in-
person meetings. 
This project was one of the first to formally include a team of experts in change 
management, and to develop an explicit change strategy. Still, the impact expected from the 
RSVP did not occur. This was mainly due to factors unrelated to the implementation 
strategy, such as the delays in the DSQ technology. In fact, the pilot project had revealed 
several problems, notably the slowness of the system. Therefore, the plan of deploying other 
pilot projects in other regions had to be altered during the course of the RSVP. Participants 
were kept informed about the global DSQ strategy but, according to our interviews, it 
became very difficult for them to know exactly what was going on at the provincial level, 
and to play their role of DSQ representative within their region. According to one physician, 
it was “impossible to know who was holding the steering wheel and to know where we 
were going”. 
The RSVP was an exemplar of a provincial government strategy informed by best practices 
in change management and the implementation of innovations. However, it took place in an 
environment that was extremely complex and was based on a technology that was not 
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mature. The change from a group composed mainly of physicians to an interdisciplinary 
group led to a profound change in the social dynamics, which also hampered the realization 
of the RSVP’s mission. 
4. Discussion of the case studies 
An analysis of the projects and events described above will now be carried out with a view 
to highlighting the possible influence of codified knowledge in relation to decisions that 
determined the projects and events described above. The main decisions that we have 
highlighted are the ones in which a government or government organization (example, 
Health Canada) decided to fund a particular project, or to propose or withdraw a proposed 
law. In the case of the CAI, several decisions were made to examine and to comment on the 
patient information practices of various projects.  
However, when presenting several of the various case studies, it also became apparent that 
a host of actors were also making various other decisions that affected the projects. Various 
actors, both individuals and organizations, had to decide whether to become active partners, 
what steps would be taken to insure the confidentiality of patient information, what 
technologies would be used and which companies would be hired, whether they would 
resist or support a project, how potential participants would be addressed so as to 
encourage their participation, and so on. Many decisions were made in relation to which 
codified knowledge could have played a role or not. At this point we can only indicate that 
we are cognizant of all these other decisions that were taking place, and which collectively 
also determined the outcome of any given project.  
Decisions concerning which projects to fund were most likely being made by senior 
government officials or, perhaps in some cases, elected representatives who were in cabinet 
(the cabinet is formed by the government ministers). Elected government officials would 
certainly have been involved in the decision to propose or withdraw a given law. At the 
project definition phase, however, key decisions would have been made by other decision-
makers. For example, the Rimouski project required a coalition of local physicians, local 
health officials, private companies, along with support from the RAMQ and certain officials 
within the Ministry of Health. The contributions to the project description (and the decision 
of these actors to participate in it) would have been influenced by the knowledge, beliefs, 
and interests of these participants. On the other hand, the decision to fund the project was 
likely taken by the Council of Ministers. In this regard, we should note that we did not have 
direct access to either of these groups at the time when decisions were being made (with the 
exception of the RSVP project). This could be an area for further historical research (i.e., 
what information did senior officials provide to the Minister of Health for the projects and 
activities discussed here). Still, a certain number of general observations can be made about 
the possible influence of codified knowledge on certain decisions that were taken. 
In general, a series of real-life, in-situ pilot projects were an integral part of the 16-year 
period we are analyzing here (1993-2009). These projects allowed the provincial government 
to develop extensive experience with the challenges and issues associated with EHR 
Codified Knowledge and Decisions in a Major eHealth Project:  
Efforts to Introduce the Electronic Health Record in Quebec 77 
projects. The projects were not part of a coordinated plan, but were rather local initiatives 
which were financed by the provincial (in the case of the Rimouski project), or primarily 
federal government (CHIPP projects), or both (DSQ project). Although the primary goal of 
these projects was not to develop "original knowledge", the goal was certainly to create 
large-scale, real-life tests of technology in an actual clinical context. The hope was that if the 
project was a success, that it would continue and the technology would become integrated 
into daily use. If it was not a success, it was implicit that participants would learn from the 
experience. Some thought had been given to how to maximize learning or knowledge 
development, since an evaluation was a part of most if not all of the projects.  
One general observation that can be drawn from the various experiments is that project 
promoters seemed to believe that the technological systems that had been developed were 
ready for real-world experimentation. Smaller scale tests to simulate the real-world 
demands on the systems seemed to be either absent, or inadequate. This could have been 
learned with the Rimouski project. In some of the projects, the project proponents appeared 
to think that the technology would "sell itself", and be relatively easy to implement, 
although the importance of attending to the users' reactions to technology and to change 
management did not seem to have been assimilated until the time of the RSVP project. This 
can be inferred especially from the CHIPP project reports about the "lessons learned". 
Project promoters seemed to be surprised that medical personnel would require computer 
systems that responded quickly to requests for information, that users would need extensive 
training and technical support, and that there could be mixed reactions to the technology on 
the part of patients, citizens, and personnel. 
These sorts of warnings were not new, even in the 1990s, and we would argue that these 
issues were common knowledge at the time in fields as diverse as management of 
information systems (for example [24]), computer supported cooperative work [25], and the 
design and implementation of IT [26]. Our interviews indicated that not all project 
promoters consulted with experts from these fields, and this was an obvious shortcoming. 
For their part, we found little evidence of senior government officials or decision-makers 
having consulted with those who had implemented IT systems in hospitals. Although the 
systems in place in hospitals at the time may have been simpler than the ones developed for 
the projects described here, lessons from the implementation of hospital systems could 
probably also have been applied in these projects. 
In the case of the Rimouski project, little scientific evidence about the benefits of EHR or 
electronic health card projects existed in the early 1990s. So, other than knowledge that was 
available in other fields or from experiments such as the one in France, it was clear that 
project planners had relatively little scientific evidence from health researchers that could 
have been used to orient the implementation strategy. Indeed, $4 million dollars was spent 
on an innovation that did not have a track record in the health field. Very little information 
was available concerning the clinical impact of the innovation. It is useful to remember that, 
at this time, the few scientific articles on the subject generally reported on individual 
hospital systems [27, 28], or announced the advent of medical computerization and its 
benefits [29, 30]. For example, the latter write in the summary of their article: "The electronic 
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medical record in the ambulatory setting will be a force to be reckoned with during the 
1990s. The increased quality of the medical record will lead to an increased quality of patient 
care at a fairly level cost (no long-term increase)." Still, the state of the literature at the time 
did not provide solid support for the hope, on the part of project proponents and 
government decision-makers, that an EHR system could be readily introduced into a whole 
city, or would lead to clinical improvements. One of the purposes of the project was 
precisely to create better knowledge about the feasibility and the requirements for such a 
system. Even today, although several countries have managed to attain a high level of use of 
an EHR by clinicians, there is still debate about its clinical impact [31]. 
Although the evaluation report about the Rimouski project included analysis of use by 
health personnel, and analysis of perceptions about the usefulness of the information that 
was made available through the system, it did not analyze clinical changes that could have 
been used to assess this project or to inform later ones. On the other hand, and in contrast 
with later projects, a significant number of dissertations were produced in relation to the 
project. The authors of the evaluation report also identified factors that would likely affect 
any further projects to introduce the smart card on a wider scale. 
Another surprising event was that the concept and technology that was active in the Laval 
electronic health card project became the basis for the law that was proposed in late 2001. 
According to one account, even more that a year after the project began (in May, 2001), only 
290 patients out of the 1678 who had received a card, actually used it [12]. In spite of results 
which were not favourable, and in spite of clear concerns on the part of the CAI with respect 
to the Laval project [12], the provincial cabinet decided to propose legislation which used 
this project as a model for a province-wide system. The low rate of adoption by patients 
could be considered to be empirical evidence that should have lead officials and cabinet to 
question the concept on which the proposed legislation was based. A similar viewpoint was 
expressed publicly in a newspaper article that appeared in the newspaper Le Devoir, May 
7th 2001, well before the legislation was tabled: "The trial of the electronic health card [in 
Laval], which Quebec wants to extend to the whole province, was not a clear success."  
As well, the simultaneous experimentation with a different network technology in the 
RIGIC project and two other simultaneous projects to create a patient record shared between 
hospitals, which we have not discussed here, obviously did not alter the government's plans 
at the time. One of these was called Arc-en-ciel, and was a project financed by the Quebec 
Ministry of Health, in order to create an EHR shared by three hospitals. Thus the Ministry of 
Health must have been aware that certain projects were experimenting with another type of 
EHR technology, and that knowledge about this type of technology was in the process of 
being developed. For whatever reason, perhaps because of concerns about the cost of this 
technology, it decided that it was not worthwhile to wait for the results of these projects.  
In 2001, the Quebec government decided to not participate in Infoway, then later, after the 
change in government in 2004, to participate. The rationale provided by informants for the 
two decisions suggested that these were not influenced by scientific evidence. The first 
decision, to not participate, seemed to stem from a desire to not accept the terms and 
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requirements stated by the federal government. The second one, to participate, appeared to 
be motivated primarily by financial considerations: the opportunity to acquire additional 
funding for an EHR in Quebec, and to a lesser extent, to obtain better deals from vendors 
through group purchases. The question of whether or not an EHR could contribute to 
positive clinical results did not appear to be discussed in either case. The participation of 
Quebec in Infoway provided opportunities to obtain information about the strategies and 
progress made elsewhere, required that Quebec document and demonstrate the 
achievement of intermediate objectives for external observers, and some knowledge transfer 
may have been an unintended consequence of participation in it. 
With the RSVP project, senior government officials demonstrated an understanding of the 
importance of developing and executing strategies that would facilitate the implementation 
of an EHR. They had clearly come into contact with and had expended effort to better 
understand scientific literature on change management and the management of the 
implementation of technology. The spheres of considered knowledge had expanded to 
include new strategies for communicating with, consultation of, and preparation of primary 
actors. The problem that arose was that the communication activities that were undertaken 
appeared to be premature. 
The actors who participated directly in a given project undoubtedly gained practical 
experience, but it is difficult at this point to evaluate the extent to which expertise developed 
by individuals in one project may have been exploited in subsequent projects. Still, our 
impression is that the level of re-employment of personnel was low since new project 
groups were formed for each of the EHR projects. This is also consistent with the findings of 
a study that examined information sharing between health informatics projects in Quebec 
and noted that there was little knowledge exchange between the projects [32]. 
Other mechanisms for learning or transfer of knowledge and expertise could have been 
formal and informal meetings. Again, we are not able to determine the extent to which 
people who were involved in one project may have had contact with those who were 
planning subsequent projects. It is worthwhile noting though, that a series of annual 
conferences were held in Quebec on the theme of computer systems and healthcare, and 
several presentations were made about the projects discussed here. This conference was a 
forum for the exchange of information. The Quebec Society of Biomedical and Health 
Informatics (SoQIBS) was created in 2001 and is still organizing annual meetings on topics 
related to health information technologies (see http://soqibs.org/). This initiative is 
supported by researchers, clinicians, commercial enterprise, and government.  
5. Strengths and limitations 
This multiple case study is one of the first studies to examine the development and 
implementation of an EHR in a jurisdiction over an extended period of time. Although it 
does not constitute a full historical analysis, which is still needed, it adds to the knowledge 
base concerning factors that have contributed to the limited success of large-scale EHR 
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implementations [2-4]. We used information from multiple sources, including scientific and 
technical literature, evaluation reports, policy documents, analysis of proposed laws, 
newspaper articles, and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders involved in the 
projects. 
We are also keenly aware that we have not been able to fully document the myriad decisions 
and influences that culminated in a decision to fund any particular project. Someone who 
wishes to do this would be advised to concentrate initially on a single project. Also, 
although we have suggested that codified knowledge seemed to have relatively little 
influence in most projects, one means of partially verifying this would be to obtain initial 
project descriptions and to check to see what scientific evidence may have been cited in 
order to justify project objectives and orientations (we did not have such documents). What 
we suspect is that other forms of "evidence" may have sometimes been used (for example, 
what people were told by project promoters during short visits to sites which may have had 
less than a fully implemented EHR, or impressions of how an EHR may change care 
processes).  
The selection of the cases under study was made by consensus among the authors, based on 
criteria such as the relative novelty of the project or activity and its importance in relation to 
later developments. However, the study of other EHR cases could potentially bring new 
insights [2]. Our analysis may also have been limited by the fact that some projects took 
place up to twenty years ago. We relied on documents that were published, as well as on the 
recall of individuals who participated in the projects. Thus, our analysis could be limited by 
the available documents and/or recall bias from interviewees. The presentation of several 
case studies has necessarily limited the amount of detail that could be provided for any one 
of these. However, the consideration of an extended period of time, triangulation of 
information, and the validation of our interpretation of each case with several respondents 
who represented different perspectives (policy-makers, researchers, and project leaders) 
likely helped us to gain a richer understanding.  
6. Conclusion 
This chapter examined decisions that have been made during the process of implementing 
particular EHR projects in the Province of Quebec, Canada. As we have indicated, a 
significant number of projects took place over the sixteen years that we have considered 
here, and these involved a variety of locations, objectives, and technologies.  
Perhaps the most surprising characteristic of this period is the limited impact of codified 
knowledge on projects and activities, and this seems to be a problem that has been 
experienced in other countries as well [2]. Technological shortcomings and the need to 
insure that the user has a positive experience, both noted in the evaluation of the Rimouski 
project, cropped up again in later projects. Observations were repeated from one project to 
another about the need to invest in change management. Warnings from the CAI about the 
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need to update legislation and to consider the complexity and depth of concerns about 
approaches to safeguarding health information did not seem to be fully considered. 
Pertinent knowledge developed outside of the health field was not transferred into it. Large 
scale pilot projects helped to develop codified knowledge but this was not fully exploited 
over time. However, a note of caution is required here, as these conclusions are tentative, 
and further investigation and analysis is required. 
In the last two decades, there has been a strong emphasis within the health field concerning, 
on the one hand, the importance of basing decisions and medical practice on scientific 
evidence, and on the other, the importance of effective knowledge transfer. Unfortunately, 
in Quebec and elsewhere, it has also taken two decades for these two philosophies and 
practices to gradually permeate into the multiple and interconnected dynamics that may 
eventually produce a provincial and a Canadian EHR. 
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